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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
LAYTON CITY,

:
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

:
:
Case No. 880653-CA

ALEX LOPEZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal arises from the Defendant's convictions of Driving
Under the Influence of Alcohol and Delaying and Obstructing an
Officer.

Those convictions were entered after a jury trial in

which the Defendant was found guilty of these two charges and
acquitted of a third.

The trial was held in the Layton Department

of the Second Circuit Court, Davis County, State of Utah.
Pursuant

to

statute,

Section

78-2a-3

(2)(d),

Utah

Code

Annotated, this Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over
appeals from the circuit courts.

4

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This

is an

appeal

from

convictions

of Driving

Under

the

Influence of Alcohol and Delaying and Obstructing and Officer in
the Layton Department of the Second Circuit Court,

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Whether the trial court properly ruled in denying Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss which complained

that Defendant's

right to a

speedy trial had been breached.

APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
United States Constitution, Sixth Amendment:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall enjoy the

right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process

for obtaining witnesses

in his favor, and to have the

Assistance of Counsel for his defense.

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof,
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance
5

of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases.
•• • •

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED Section 76-1-302 (l)(b)

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this part, prosecutions
for

other

offenses

are

subject

to

the

following

periods

of

limitation:
•• •

(b) a prosecution for a misdemeanor other than
negligent homicide shall be commenced within two
years after it is committed;
•• • •

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a criminal case involving the traffic offenses of
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and Failure to Remain at
the

Scene

of

an

Accident,

and

the

offense

of

Delaying

and

Obstructing an Officer, all class B misdemeanors against Alex Lopez
(hereinafter "Defendant").
The charges herein are the result of an incident that occurred
on August 16, 1986 within Layton City.
officers were

investigating

While police

a citizen's complaint

of a vehicle

running over a mail box, they came across the Defendant and an

6

acquaintance.

As they were

speaking

to the Defendant

and the

acquaintance, they were approached by the Defendant's wife, Barbara
Lopez (hereinafter "Barbara")/ who was subsequently arrested for
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol (hereinafter "DUI") after
she informed the investigating officers, in the presence of the
Defendant, that she was the driver of the vehicle involved in the
incident.

A jury trial was held December 5, 1986 wherein Barbara,

the defendant therein, and the Defendant herein testified that the
Defendant, and not Barbara, was the driver.

Barbara was acquitted.

Thereafter, charges of DUI, Leaving the Scene of an Accident,
and Delaying and Obstructing an Officer were filed against the
Defendant on January 26, 1987.

At the pre-trial on March 31, 1987

the trial court granted the parties seven (7) days to attempt a
resolution.

No resolution was made or presented

to the trial

court.
After having discovered that no trial setting was made, the
trial court set a second pre-trial dated for January 13, 1988.
The Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on January 28, 1988.

A

hearing on the Defendant's motion was held on March 11, 1988 and
the Defendant's motion was denied and a jury trial was set for
April 11, 1988.
A jury trial was held April 11, 1988 and at the conclusion
thereof

the

jury

returned

a verdict

of guilty on the DUI and

Delaying and Obstructing charges and acquitted the Defendant of
Leaving

the

Scene

of

an

Accident.

The

trial

court

entered

convictions on the charges of which the jury found the Defendant
7

guilty•
Defendant makes this appeal,

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At

approximately

4:00

a.m.

on August

16, 1986

the Layton

Police were notified that a vehicle had just run up over a curb
and

destroyed

a

mail

box,,

(Barbara

Lopez

Trial

Transcript

(hereinafter "B.L. Tr.") pp. 22, 23).
The Defendant approached a neighbor asking for "a jump" to
get the vehicle restarted, and stated that his "wife was driving."
(B.L. Tr. pg.

16).

The

owner

of the mailbox

confronted

the

Defendant, and the Defendant, without providing any identification
or other information, assured the owner that Defendant would "pay
for that."
vehicle.

(B.L. Tr. pg. 23), as the Defendant headed towards the
Since the vehicle could not be restarted, the Defendant,

along with the other occupants of the vehicle, began pushing it
down the road.
As

the

(B.L. Tr. pg„ 23).

police

arrived,

the

Defendant

and

his

companions

scattered on foot, leaving the vehicle at the side of the roadway.
(B.L. Tr. pg. 27). Officer Steven Brown stopped the Defendant and
"Marty" Martinez, an apparent occupant of the vehicle, as they were
leaving the area of the vehicle.

(B.L. Tr. pp. 32, 36).

Officer

Brown immediately noticed that the Defendant and Martinez had been
drinking and he then initiated

an investigation

for a possible

Driving Under the Influence violation in addition to the Leaving
the Scene of an Accident complaint.
8

(B.L. Tr. pp. 35, 36).

No

sooner did Officer Brown begin asking questions about the incident
/hen

Barbara

surrounding
driver."

Lopez,
foliage

the
and

Defendant's
stated

wife,

"Leave

them

emerged
alone,

from

the

I was

the

(B.L. Tr. pp. 37-39, 57).

The Defendant and Martinez acquiesced in this assertion and
Barbara Lopez continued her assertion that she was the driver, that
she ran down the mailbox, etc.

(B.L. Tr. pp. 38, 39).

Officer

Brown noticed that she too had been consuming alcohol and requested
that Barbara Lopez perform field sobriety tests.
39).

(B.L. Tr. pg.

At the conclusion of those tests she was placed under arrest

for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol.

(B.L. Tr. pg. 49).

All of this was done in the presence of the Defendant and Martinez
with no objections being made.

The Defendant watched as his wife

was arrested, handcuffed, placed into a patrol vehicle and driven
off to jail.

(B.L.Tr. pp. 70-71).

Barbara Lopez appeared through counsel and the Circuit Court
set a Pre-trial for September

15, 1986.

September 23, 1986 and was then held.

That was continued to

At that hearing the Circuit

Court set a jury trial date for December 5, 1986.

At that trial,

Barbara Lopez and the Defendant testified that the Defendant was
the actual driver.

(B.L. Tr. pp. 53, 84).

The jury acquitted

Barbara Lopez.
After evaluating the evidence, the City, on or about January
23, 1987, filed charges against the Defendant for DUI, Leaving the
Scene of an Accident, and Delaying and Obstructing an Officer.
(Tr. Ct. Rec. pp. 4-7). On January 27, 1987 the Circuit Court set
9

February 9, 1987 as Defendant's arraignment.

On that day the

Defendant called the Circuit Court stating that the Defendant's
counsel was to "call in an appearance."
Pursuant

thereto

the Circuit

(Tr. Ct. Rec. pg. 1).

Court allowed

a continuance

to

February 17, 1987. (Tr. Ct. Rec. pg. 1). On February 27, 1987 the
Circuit Court set a pre-trial in this case for March 31, 1987. At
the pre-trial the Circuit Court allowed the parties seven (7) days
within which to reach a resolution or otherwise the matter would
be set for trial.

(Tr. Ct. Rec. pg. 1).

resolution was given to the Circuit Court.

No notice of any

(Tr. Ct. Rec. pg. 1).

After it was discovered that no action had been taken, the
Circuit Court, on December 30, 1987, set a pre-trial for January
13, 1988. At that pre-trial, defendant informed the Court of his
intent to request a dismissal because of the delay. Defendant was
to file a Motion to Dismiss based on the speedy trial issue within
ten (10) days, being January 23, 1988.

(Tr. Ct. Rec. pg. 1). The

Motion was subsequently filed January 28, 1988 and was the first
time the speedy trial issue was asserted.

(Tr. Ct. Rec. pg. 1).

On February 25, 1988 the Circuit Court set a hearing on the
Defendant's Motion to dismiss for March 11, 1988 and that hearing
was held.

(Tr. Ct. Rec. Pg. 1). Although not reflected in the

docket, after hearing argument the Circuit Court denied Defendant's
Motion.

After so ruling, and in an effort to have this matter

heard quickly, the trial court set a jury trial for April 11, 1988
which required the resetting of another jury trial already set for
that day.

(Tr. Ct. Rec. pg. 1).
10

The Circuit Court then sent

written

confirmation

of

the

trial

date

on

March

18, 1988

to

Defendant, and, due to an apparent mailing error, to the City on
March 29, 1988.

(Tr. Ct. Rec. pg. 1),

On April 11, 1988 a jury trial was held and the Defendant was
convicted of DUI and Delaying and Obstructing an Officer, and was
acquitted of Leaving the Scene of an Accident.

(Tr. Ct. Rec. pg.

2).
Thereafter Defendant has taken this appeal.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Defendant claims a deprivation of his right to a speedy
trial.

However,

the

Defendant

cannot

satisfy

the

criteria

established by this Court in reviewing such challenges, those being
length of delay, reason for delay, assertion of the right, and
whether prejudice resulted.
The Defendant is the cause of a very substantial portion of
the delays in this proceeding, effectuating a waiver of the right
of which he claims deprivation.

The Defendant never asserted the

right to a speedy trial but merely filed a motion to dismiss based
on the lack of a speedy trial.
Further, the Defendant makes a naked allegation of prejudice
based on fading memories.

The unsubstantiated allegations are not

sufficient to support Defendant's claims.
the

delays

being

intentional

or

There is no evidence of

oppressive,

nor

is there

indication of an advantage gained by the prosecution
delays.
11

any

for these

Finally, all of the filings, hearings and trials were within
the statue of limitation time period, the primacy protection for
a

defendant

from having

to defend

against

a stale

criminal

allegation.
Defendant has failed to establish any basis upon which a
speedy trial deprivation claim may be founded.

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE DEFENDANT
WAS NOT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.

A.

Defendant

cannot

satisfy

the

requirements

of

establishing a deprivation of his right to a speedy trial
under the Utah State of the federal constitution

Defendant contends that the time period that lapsed between
the August 16, 1986 incident and the April 11, 1988 trial denied
his right to a speedy trial.

In analyzing an allegation of a

deprivation of one's right to a speedy trial, the United States
Supreme Court established four (4) primary criteria.

Barker v.

Wingo, 407 U.S. 514; 33 L.Ed.2d 101; 92 S.Ct. 2182 (1972).

That

four part test has subsequently been utilized and then adopted by
the Utah Supreme Court in the cases of State v. Knill, 656 P.2d
1026 (Utah 1982), State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115 (Utah 1982),
State v. Hafen, 593 P.2d 538 (Utah 1979), and State v. Giles, 576
P.2d 876 (Utah 1978).

The Utah Court of Appeals now utilizes this
12

same test.

State v. Miller, 747 P.2d 440 (Utah App. 1987).

four factors are:

"(1) length of delay;

(2) reason for delay;

(3) Defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial;
prejudice to Defendant from the delay."

These

and (4)

Miller, supra, at 442

(citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192).

1.

Length of Delay

The incident resulting in the charges being filed occurred
August 16, 1986 and the trial concerning those charges in which
the Defendant was found guilty was held April 11, 1988, (Tr. Ct.
Rec. pg. 2 ) , not May 4, 1988 or May 19, 1988 as inconsistently
alleged by Defendant in his brief.
pp. 3,5,6,8).

(App. brief, title page and

Although this time period is five (5) days short of

twenty (20) months, a significant portion is attributable to the
Defendant.

At the conclusion of the following analysis regarding

the Reason for the Delay, this Court will realize that the only
period

defendant

can

complain

of, while

yet

maintaining

responsibility therefor, is a nine (9) month period.

some

Such a delay

of nine (9) months, however, should not in and of itself "trigger"
a review of the remaining criteria.
substantially
required.

inordinate

Only if a time period is

is a review of the

remaining

criteria

State v Banks. 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986).

2.
Defendant

Reason for the Delay

first complains

about the five

(5) month period

between the August 16, 1986 incident and the filing of the charges
13

on January 26, 1987. Defendant presents this as an unnecessary and
unreasonable length of time.
facts are uncontroverted.

That is a misrepresentation.

The

The officers investigating the accident

came upon the Defendant and a male acquaintance of the defendant.
While assessing the occurrence

of a Driving Under the Influence

of Alcohol ("DUI") violation, the Defendant's wife, Barbara Lopez,
confronted the officers and claimed to be the driver.
pp. 37-39, 57).

She was given field sobriety tests and then

arrested for DUI all in the presence of this Defendant.
pp. 38-39, 70).

(B.L. Tr.

(B.L. Tr.

Not until the day of Barbara Lopez's trial,

December 5, 1986, did the Defendant ever assert that he, this
Defendant, was the driver.
Defendant

not

participated

(B.L. Tr. pp. 53, 84).
and

acquiesced

in

the

Had the
fraudulent

representation that his wife was the driver, causing his wife to
be tested, arrested, jailed and then tried, it would have been
Defendant's case that would have been disposed of on December 5,
1986.
Clearly then, the first four (4) months of delay rest solely
upon the Defendant.

Further, Defendant's conduct that is contrary

to his stated desire for a speedy trial constitutes a waiver of his
right to a speedy trial. State v. Stillings, 709 P.2d 348, at 349
(Utah 1985)(citing State v. Truiillo, 656 P.2d 403 (1982)).
With regard to the month between Defendant's wife's trial and
the filing of charges against Defendant, it has been a consistent
position by the courts that the delay between the date of the crime
and the date the charges are filed need not be considered in a
14

speedy

trial

violation

claim.

"The

constitutional

protection

afforded one relative to a speedy trial has no application until
after a prosecution is instituted.
Cir.,

290 F.2d

See Foley v. United States, 8

562, Cert. Den. 368 U.S. 888, 82 S.Ct.

139, 7

L.Ed.2d 88 (1961), holding that prosecution is not instituted until
an indictment is returned or an information is filed." State v.
Renzo, 443 P.2d 392 (Utah 1968).
The

reasoning

the

courts

have

utilized

in

stating

the

inapplicability of speedy trial rights to pre-arrest delays is that
without having the charges filed there are none of the restraints
on one's liberty nor the oppressive conditions hanging over one's
head as compared with one who has been charged and is awaiting
trial. State v. Smith, 699 P.2d 711 (Utah 1985).
Based on the rulings in the Renzo and Smith cases, the entire
five (5) month period before the filing of the charges against the
defendant is inapplicable to the defendant's contention of a speedy
trial right violation.
After the charges were filed, the next hearing was the pretrial scheduled for March 31, 1987.
court

allowed

the

parties

time

At the pre-trial the trial
within

which

to

attempt

a

resolution and the trial court set the date of April 7, 1987, by
which these negotiations needed to be completed. (Tr. Ct. Rec. pg.
1).

Thereafter, the docket is absent of any contact by either

party with the trial court.

There is no action reflected in the

Docket until December 30, 1987.
This delay is not unlike the delay the Utah Supreme Court
15

addressed in State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986).

In Banks,

the Defendant was arraigned in October 1981 and trial was set for
February 1982.

Defendant filed a suppression motion in February

that was denied and the trial date was rescheduled to May 11, 1982.
On the trial date the parties submitted the case to the judge on
stipulated facts.
a decision.

Unfortunately the judge died before rendering

The presiding

judge of that district

ordered

the

parties to prepare and file stipulations in order for the case to
be assigned

to another

judge for disposition.

Thereafter, the

parties failed to file the required stipulations and the case laid
dormant for an additional eighteen (18) months.
1382.

Banks, supra, at

The Court therein ruled that this eighteen (18) month delay

was substantial to the extent that it "triggered" the necessity of
addressing the remaining criteria.

Banks, supra, at 1385.

In the case at bar the trial court gave the parties seven (7)
days within which to propose a resolution or obtain a trial date.
Neither party contacted the trial court and the case was idle for
nine (9) months, from March 31, 1987 to December 30, 1987, less
than half of the time elapsed in Banks.

The City submits to this

Court that this nine (9) month delay should not in and of itself
trigger the review of the remaining criteria.
The Court in Banks, further stated that since the fault for
the delay

"can be laid at the door of both the prosecutor and

Banks," Banks could not take advantage of the error.
continued:

16

The Court

The prosecutor claimed to have sent the stipulation
to defense counsel.
Although the prosecutor may
have failed to mail the document, Banks is not
entitled to take advantage of that clerical error.
His counsel was jointly responsible for preparing
the stipulation.
When the stipulation did not
arrive, Banks's counsel should have taken steps to
locate it, inasmuch as his counsel had as much
obligation to provide that document to the court as
did the prosecutor. Given his counsel's awareness
of the need for a stipulation on the record, his
failure to pursue the matter is difficult to
understand.
Banks, supra, at 1386.
The City would urge upon this Court that a nine (9) month
delay does not require the additional

review, particularly when

such a delay did not forestall the disposition of a case within
the statute of limitations and/or wherein defendant must share
responsibility for the delay.

Banks, supra, at 1386.

Just as

Banks was disallowed from taking advantage of the procedural error
therein, the Defendant herein must not be granted a dismissal when
he was equally

responsible

for contacting the trial court, the

failure of which resulted in the delay.
In the alternative,

if Defendant

asserts culpability upon

either the prosecution or the trial court, at most the delay may
constitute mere negligence.
State's

Supreme

Court

Even if the allegation is made, this

addressed

such

an

issue

and

stated:

"Assuming, arguendo, that Salt Lake County officials were negligent
in Defendant's prosecution, neglect is 'a more neutral reason' for
a delay which, in this case, does not justify relief." State v.
Stilling, 770 P.2d 137, citing Barker, supra, at 531.

17

The remaining time period, from December 30, 1987 until the
trial date, is a time period that, other than the two (2) weeks
required to set and then hear the January 13, 1988 pre-trial, is
solely attributable to the Defendant.
1325 (Utah 1986).

State V. Banner, 717 P.2d

At that pre-trial Defendant informed the trial

court of his intention to move to dismiss this case based on lack
of a speedy trial.

Defendant was ordered

to file said motion

within ten (10) days but did not do so for fifteen (15) days.
Ct. Rec. pg. 1 ) .

After

(Tr.

receiving Defendant's motion the trial

court set a hearing and Defendant's motion was heard March 11, 1988
and denied.

At that hearing the trial court set Defendant's trial

for April 11, 1988.

In an effort to accommodate the Defendant, the

trial court set this matter as soon as was possible, which required
the resetting of a jury trial already set for April 11, 1988.
time required

The

to receive, set, hear, and rule upon Defendant's

motion is solely attributable to the Defendant.

State v. Miller,

747 P.2d 440, at 442 (Utah App. 1987); Banner, supra at 1330.
3. Defendant's Assertion of the Right to Speedy Trial
The third criteria to be considered in a claim of denial of
a

speedy

trial

Barker, supra.
asserted

that

is whether

the

Defendant

asserted

said

right.

There is no dispute that the Defendant neither
right nor requested a speedy trial.

Defendant's

failure to assert said right "makes it difficult for Defendant to
prove that he was denied a speedy trial.11

Banks, supra at 1386.

After discovering that this case was not set for trial, the
trial court then set the January 13, 1988 pre-trial.
18

It was not

antil that pre-trial that the "speedy trial" issue was raised and
even at that it was not a request or demand for a speedy trial but
was presented as a motion to dismiss based thereon.

There is a

distinction between asserting the speedy trial right and moving to
dismiss for lack of a speedy trial as indicated in State v. Ossana,
739 P.2d 628 (Utah 1987).
right

to

a

information

"At no time did Defendant assert his

speedy

trial.

dismissed

for

Defendant
lack

did

of a speedy

move

to

have

the

trial...." Ossana,

supra, at 631.
It is clear
right.

that the Defendant has failed

to assert

this

Even if his motion to dismiss was interpreted as being such

an assertion, the remaining delays from that time until the April
11,

1988

trial

Defendant.

date,

are

solely

upon

the

shoulders

of

the

And, if the motion to dismiss is taken as such an

assertion the trial court responded and the trial was timely held.
Banner, supra.

4.

Whether Defendant Was Prejudiced by the Delay

The final criteria utilized in analyzing the issue at hand is
whether the Defendant suffered any prejudice by the delay.

The

United States Supreme Court in Barker, supra., identified three
interests to be protected and weighed

in evaluating a claim of

prejudice and that same scheme was adopted by this State's Supreme
Court.

Ossana, supra.

preventing
anxiety

oppressive

and

concern

Those "interests to be protected are:
pre-trial
of

the

incarceration;
accused;

19

and

(3)

(1)

(2) minimizing
limiting

the

possibility that the defense would be impaired."

Ossana, supra,

at 631 (footnote omitted).
Concerning the first interest, the Defendant has never been
incarcerated for this offense.
were

really

prejudicial,

expeditious trial."

Secondly, "If anxiety and concern

Defendant

was

free

Ossana, supra, at 632.

to

demand

an

Nor has Defendant

alleged any anxiety or concern.
The third interest, that of the impairment of the defense, is
the only one Defendant asserts as a basis for prejudice, and that
was done with a self serving affidavit filed nearly one month after
the jury trial. (Trial record pp. 37-40).

The only claim of

prejudice in Defendant's affidavit is that of loss of memory by him
and his possible three witnesses.

This fading of memories would

be the same burden the City would have as the City also used a lay
witness in addition to two (2) police officers.

Further, in the

first trial, wherein Defendant's wife Barbara, was the defendant,
Barbara, the Defendant herein and only one passenger testified.
The Defendant had received copies of the officers' reports and had
access to the recording and/or transcript of the prior trial.
Finally, the claim of prejudice by fading memories is not
substantiated or supported but merely alleged, which is not enough
to warrant consideration by this Court. State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d
1187 (Utah 1984).
set

forth

Nowhere in Defendant's brief are any examples

supporting

Defendant's

naked

allegation

of

fading

memories, thus "no pursuasive allegation of prejudice from the
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delay on the ground that his defense was impaired," has been made.
Banner, supra at 1330.

B.

Defendant cannot satisfy the alternative criteria

utilized

by

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

in

analyzing

complaints of speedy trial right deprivations.

The Supreme Court of this State has on occasion used other
factors when addressing speedy trial right deprivation claims.
The

Court

has

stated

that

the

purpose

of

the

speedy

trial

provision,
is to guard against any intentional delay which may be
oppressive or persecutorial in nature. In order to avoid
any such baneful effect the requirements of the law
should be respected and complied with insofar as can be
achieved within the practical operations of the courts.
However, the court does not lose jurisdiction because of
such a delay and, unless there is some intentional delay
of an oppressive character, which results in prejudice
to the defendant, the processes of justice should not be
wholly defeated thereby. It is for this reason that this
court has consistently held that the statutory time
within which a trial shall be had is directory and not
mandatory.
State v. Archeletta, 577 P.2d 547, at 548 (Utah 1978).

Clearly

there is no such intentional occurrence in the matter before this
Court.
Another consideration is whether the prosecution obtained some
"tactical advantage over the defendant because of the delay or
prejudiced

defendant

prejudicially stale."

by

allowing

the

evidence

Smith, supra, at 714.

to

become

In addressing this

same consideration the Court also stated "that the defendant made
21

no showing that the delay in bringing the charge against him was
intentional

or

prosecution."

designed

to

produce

an

advantage

for

the

State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah 1985).

In Bailey the Court further acknowledged the fact that the
case was brought within the "statutory period of limitation, U.C.A,
1953, Section

76-1-302, and stated

that that is the primary

safeguard against prejudice resulting from having to defend against
stale criminal charges."

Bailey, supra, at 284, citing U.S. v.

Marion, 404 U.S. at 332, 92 S. Ct. at 464.

It is undisputed that

the case at bar was initiated and concluded within the statutory
period of limitations, being two (2) years.

Section 76-1-302

(l)(b) Utah Code Annotated, as amended.

CONCLUSION
The only period of delay not solely attributable to the
defendant is the nine (9) months from the March 31, 1987 pretrial
to the December 30, 1987 setting of the subsequent pretrial.

The

City would submit that this is not a length of time that triggers
the speedy trial review.

Alternatively, if the delay is to be

reviewed, it is clear that defendant must share the blame for even
that period

of time

and

then

is solely

responsible

for the

remaining delays that were caused by his confusing antics and
subsequent motions.

Further, the fact that defendant failed to

assert his right to a speedy trial must weigh heavily against the
defendant in considering his belated claim of a deprivation of that
right. Finally, defendant's naked allegations of prejudice are not
22

conditions suffered by the prosecution.
In conclusion

the

City

requests

this

Court

to adopt

the

conclusion of State v. Hafen, 593 P.2d 538 (Utah 1979):
The facts of this case do not show an intentional
delay of an oppressive character resulting in prejudice
to the defendant.

The defendant's right to a speedy

trial was not abused, and the trial court was correct in
refusing to dismiss the action.

The right to a speedy

trial is meant to be a shield against oppression, and not
a

sword

to

be

used

to decapitate

the

processes

of

justice.
Hafen, supra, at 541 (emphasis added).

The City respectfully requests that the defendant's conviction
be affirmed,

the stay of execution be lifted, and the City be

awarded costs.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

Q

day of April, 1990.

JL.
ttorney
ton City
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Brief of Respondent was mailed to Defendant's Attorney, Steven^C.
Vanderlinden, 1133 North Main, Layton, Utah 84041 on this 1V_
day of April, 1990.

Attorney
yton City
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